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SY ADLER 
The Evolution of Federal Transit Policy 
first major piece of national transit legislation was enacted in 1964. 
1969 the Urban Ma~s Transportation Administration was the subject 
a highly critical analysis by staff investigators for a Congressional Appro-
. Committee, and in the early 1970s industry analysts sharply 
the rationality of urban transit policy in general. In 1981 the 
General of the U.S. reported to Congress that the demand 
transit subsidies was approaching crisis proportions. I The U. S. govern-
has come to playa greater role in the transit industry than do most 
counterparts, provides more passenger subsidy per ride than any 
country, and, though transit is everywhere subsidized, the U.S. 
government subsidizes a greater share of industry costs than most 
national governments. l This article examines the circumstances 
which this particular industry-government relationship developed. 
part of this industrial policy discussion, the article also looks at the 
ture of discourse that was present during the early intervention period 
that has been characteristic of the transit policy community since 
at time. 3 
David Jones argues that the federal program failed to address the under-
ing causes of the widespread financial distress of the urban transit indus-
during the post":"Worid War II period, a reflection of the fact that 
irtually no attention was given to the economics of transit operations. " 
e critiques federal government intervention on the grounds that "policy 
s being built for and around the racehorses, not the workhorses, of the 
nsit industry," by which he means that policy focused on the suburb-to-
ntral city journey rather than on the intra-urban travel that was the 
ead and butter of city transit properties. Moreover, he claims that the 
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federal bureaucracy charged with administering the transit program consis-
tently deferred to local priorities and judgments. 4 
This article argues that transit policy was indeed captured-at the 
outset-by central business district activists in cities across the country 
seeking to enhance the locational advantages of their place in the face of 
increasingly intense competition from suburban business centers. The 
mayor of Atlanta, testifying to a congressional committee in 1961 on 
behalf of the American Municipal Association and the U.S. Conference 
of Mayors, precisely articulated the theme that Jones pinpoints as leading 
to policy failure : "The greatest dilemma is this . Mass transportation has 
failed to keep pace with the explosive growth of our suburban areas . . .. 
Our mass transportation facilities must be stretched out into these new 
suburban areas. . . . Most of the strangling congestion on our central city 
streets results from the fact that private operators find it unprofitable to 
expand their services into the less densely populated suburban areas. It is a 
vital public necessity that such service be provided .... If they are vital 
public necessities, yet unprofitable to operate privately, they must be 
subsidized. "5 
The central city focus of the federal program reflected a strategic shift 
by transit advocates in congressional policy-making tactics, away from the 
commuter railroad problems of a few big metropolitan areas-and the 
jurisdiction of the congressional commerce committees that dealt with 
railroad transportation matters-toward a broader concern with urban 
transportation and related land-use issues. The constituency for interven-
tion was broadened, and the issues were addressed by the more interven-
tionist and city-oriented banking and currency committees. However, 
shortly after the legislative breakthrough in 1964, the transit program and 
its implementing bureaucracy were moved to the newly established De-
partment of Transportation, rather than being permanently lodged with 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Although it was 
not especially controversial at the time, the shift institutionalized a set of 
conflicts between Transportation's continuing efforts to rationalize the 
supply of transit facilities and deeply rooted congressional efforts to subsi-
dize the competitive exertions of central city constituents. 
These conflicts, whether expressed on the terrain of land use or of 
transport supply, were present in the original debates regarding the nature 
and purposes of transit policy, and reflected a growing executive branch 
concern with rationalizing the national government's myriad interven-
tions in these spheres. 6 This rationalizing concern, which characterized 
both Republican and Democratic administrations and grew in intensity as 
congresionally driven program subsidies escalated, is one of the key dimen-
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sions of transit industrial policy analyzed below. However, before turning 
to a discussion of the dynamics of intervention, the article first grounds 
the evolution of federal policy in the context of local responses to the 
decline of the mostly privately owned transit industry during the 1940s 
and 1950s. 
Responding to Industry Decline 
As the financial and service problems of urban transit worsened in the 
post-World War II period, industry leaders advocated several steps to 
restore profitable operations and to prevent government takeovers of pri-
vate properties. However, as the limits of these responses became increas-
ingly evident to central city business and to political and technical activ-
ists, and as competition between central business districts and growing 
outlying business centers intensified, downtown interests sought to create 
regionwide governmental transit agencies that would invest in the types 
of services and facilities that would enhance the accessibility and recep-
tion capacity of the core. Represen'tatives of outlying business centers 
resisted these initiatives, which produced governmental transit agencies 
with limited capabilities. These local political constraints, combined with 
state legislative reluctance to subsidize urban projects, reinforced a tum by 
downtown activists to the federal government. 
In order to reverse the declining fortunes of their industry, leaders 
exhorted transit firms to pursue several different strategies. These ideas 
were Widely discussed in the industry press and successes were loudly 
trumpeted to encourage others to adopt the innovations. First and fore-
most, transit properties were advised to establish and maintain close work-
ing alliances with downtown merchants and property owners, major news-
papers, and city political officials. The key to these alliances, according to 
their industry leadership, was an awareness of shared fate. The financial 
fu ture of all the alliance partners was intimately related to the health of 
the downtown economy, and transit operators had to convince these 
others that a thriving central business district required a viable transit 
system. 7 
Solid working relationships would, in tum, facilitate the adoption of 
various street and parking management tactics that would expedite the 
flow of surface transit vehicles, thereby improving the efficiency of opera-
tions. These included the elimination of on-street parking in the down-
t~wn area during the day or at least during peak periods, the provision of 
fnnge parking/shuttle bus service, controls on turning movements, and 
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the radical notion of reserving traffic lanes on the main downtown routes 
exclusively for transit vehicles during rush hours. New Orleans and Chi-
cago set up fringe lots in the late 1940s. Philadelphia banned on-street 
parking downtown during the 1952 Christmas shopping season, and later 
generalized the practice, following a suggestion made by the major transit 
company there, and in early 1956 Nashville set up the first traffic lane 
reserved exclusively for buses. s Nashville's mayor Ben West, who was also 
a leading activist in the American Municipal Association during the 
1950s, was hailed as a hero by the industry. The editors of Mass Transpor-
tation wrote in their report on the 1956 American Transit Association 
convention that "the best speech ... was given by Mayor Ben West of 
Nashville, Tennessee. But we had the feeling that there was not complete 
realization by transit men that here, in the person of this energetic mayor 
and in the things that have been accomplished in Nashville, was every-
thing transit seeks in the way of city operation."9 
Transit industry leaders also hoped that an alliance with downtown 
interests would lead to support for a set of long-sought changes in the 
regulatory environment within which privately owned firms operated, 
and in fare practices. These were aimed at reducing costs, boosting produc-
tivity, and enhancing revenues. The industry sought emancipation from 
what were perceived to be oppressive franchise taxes and gross revenue 
levies; rigid rate structures, which made it impossible to raise and lower 
fares in a timely manner; and severe constraints on operators' capacity to 
drop service on unprofitable lines. Houston, for example, lowered gross 
receipts taxes in 1952, and the press kept a scoreboard of reductions in 
various taxes and forms of regulatory relief granted by states and cities 
around the country. 10 
On the revenue side, industry leaders called for the introduction of 
distance-based or zonal fare structures and peak period pricing. Industry 
analysts noted that while off-peak riding was precipitously declining, 
peak-priced ridership was holding its own. Moreover, the postwar round 
of fare increases was driving away the short-haul passenger. In early 1956 
Toledo instituted a downtown free fare zone as part of a zone fare system, 
and the St. Louis transit company reduced off-peak fares for downtown 
trips during shopping hours and also worked out a deal with downtown 
merchants to subsidize shopper travel. II 
While the transit industry promoted these institutional, fare, and traffic 
management changes, their alliance partners representing downtown 
sought a variety of service innovations in return for their support. These 
had mostly to do, as the Atlanta mayor told the Congress in 1961, with 
extending service to rapidly developing suburban areas, and providing 
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peak-period express service between these outlying areas and the central 
business district. These were the sorts of services that investors rooted in 
downtown sought to deploy in order to counter the competitive threat 
posed by suburban business centers and their acres of free parking. These 
were, however, the most costly services for the transit industry-already 
reeling from the financially devastating effects of the peaking problem-
to supply. IZ 
The St. Louis Public Service Company, the major transit supplier in 
that city, was widely regarded as "The Showpiece of the Transit Industry," 
largely because of the property's heroic efforts to respond, on behalf of 
downtown, to the suburban challenge. The company instituted a number 
of peak-period express bus routes between outlying areas and the core and 
ran shopper expresses as well. It utilized park-and-ride lots in suburban 
areas and fielded the nation's largest fleet of air-conditioned buses. The 
company president lobbied incessantly for exclusive bus lanes on the 
downtown streets, as had been introduced in Nashville. Nashville Transit 
initiated De Luxe commuter service using a subscription bus approach in 
early 1955, as did the Cincinnati operation, and the Washington, D. C. , 
transit firm proposed to offer subscription-type club express service. These 
were aimed at attracting the long-distance traveler. I3 
While there was some movement in the direction of these sorts of peak 
period, long-distance express services, privately owned firms generally 
resisted downtown pleas to increase significantly their offerings in this 
area. Pacific Electric Railway in Los Angeles, which had resumed a lim-
ited number of express runs in 1946 that had been suspended during the 
war explained that "express service during the peak hours of travel has 
stimulated such peak hour travel without any appreciable effect on the 
mid-day or off-peak travel. It is a well known fact that all peak-hour 
travel, while undoubtedly of material benefit to the community served 
and to the passengers using it, has had a detrimental effect upon the 
earnings of the Company. "14 While deteriorating financial circumstances 
sharply constrained the capacity of private firms to provide these sorts of 
services, the few city-owned transit systems in the country were checked 
by municipal boundaries. The San Francisco Municipal Railway, for exam-
ple, inaugurated express services from outlying parts of the city and put 
buses on freeways as quickly as segments opened to traffic, but Muni could 
not penetrate the rapidly growing sections of the peninsula south of the 
City or extend into the eastern or northern parts of the bay region. 15 
As a result of the financial exhaustion of the private companies and the 
limits of city-based public alternatives, downtown activists initiated move-
ments to create regionwide governmental transit agencies with the politi-
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cal and financial power to provide the kinds of facilities and services that 
were seen as crucial to the survival of the central business district. These 
same activists were also in the forefront of the drive to launch a massive 
freeway building program that would include urban extensions of the 
interstate system. Nashville mayor Ben West, hero of the transit industry, 
was also the chair of the American Municipal Association's Highways 
Committee. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Public Works Committee 
in 1955 about the national highway program, he articulated the cities' 
interest in metropolitan freeways and explained that a large-scale federal 
program was necessary because of rural domination of state legislatures. 
"We are going to be lost balls in the high weeds," he said, "because we 
cannot get enough money [from the states] to take care of that tremen-
dous load of cost of acquisition of rights-of-way. "16 
Downtown activists sought transport facilities that would radiate from 
the core into outlying areas. Combining freeway and transit facili ties 
within the same right-of-way-a set of downtown/radial corridors-was 
their ideal configuration. Such transport facilities would enable people to 
make increasingly lengthy, metropolitan-scale trips quickly, and, together 
with parking lots, would supply the central business district with virtually 
unlimited reception capacity. The idea surfaced in Detroit in a 1920s 
report by a group of five prominent businessmen calling for the construc-
tion of a network of "superhighways" that would incorporate transit in the 
median strip. Rail transit in freeway medians was the objective of a Los 
Angeles Chamber of Commerce-led movement in that region in the late 
1940s, and the first such facility in the U. S., a rail line in the median strip 
of the Congress Street Expressway in Chicago, opened in 1958. 17 How-
ever, creating the governmental capacities that were necessary to finance 
such multimodal corridor projects, as well as separate transit facilities, was 
quite difficult politically. 
California central business districts experienced the full force of subur-
ban competition more intensely than elsewhere during the early postwar 
period. Efforts to create regional transit agencies in three California urban 
areas during the 1940s and 1950s reveal the political conflicts that at-
tended these downtown responses. These conflicts would shortly charac-
terize other metropolitan areas as well. When the Los Angeles Chamber 
of Commerce launched its drive to create a rapid transit district that 
would place rail lines in several downtown/radial freeways-which the 
Chamber had played a leading role in winning-opposition surfaced in 
the large number of outlying business centers, within as well as without 
the city, to the new governmental entity. The basis of resistance was 
straightforward, reflecting the fundamental way in which the intense 
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competition between business centers in the region to maintain and at-
tract mobile capital investment structured the dynamics of transport poli-
tics: outlying business center representatives opposed subsidizing transport 
projects that would primarily benefit the Los Angeles central business 
district. 18 
The intense political conflict surrounding the downtown-oriented tran-
sit initiative produced, in 1951, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, which so clearly reflected the stalemate that prevailed in the 
region that it was thoroughly paralyzed for several years. In 1957 this 
regional government agency was finally enabled to buyout the private 
firms, but was too financially and politically constrained to implement 
much of the key elements of the downtown program. 19 
A downtown San Francisco-led rapid transit movement emerged shortly 
after its Los Angeles counterpart, which eventually succeeded in building 
the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system. However, the same conflicts 
that characterized the Los Angeles experience surfaced in the Bay region, 
nearly derailing the project there as well. In the end, a much smaller system 
than transit activists originally conceived was built. During the early years 
of the transit movement in the Bay Area, the main line of conflict sepa-
rated downtown activists in San Francisco and Oakland, with the Oakland 
leadership perceiving the San Francisco proposal as yet another attempt by 
its larger competitor to defend the historic pattern of regional domination 
and prevent downtown Oakland from playing the hegemonic office-
commercial role in the rapidly growing East Bay portion of the region. The 
Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission was created in 1951, during the same 
legislative session as its Los Angeles analogue, and was equally as con-
strained. During the next few years, however, San Francisco and Oakland 
activists reached an accommodation-built around an underwater trans-
bay tube-that promised to permit both downtowns jointly to penetrate 
rapidly growing suburban areas. 
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District, created in 1957, reflected the San 
FranCisco-Oakland settlement; however, the growth of several business 
centers on the peninsula south of San Francisco during the 1950s led to 
another rupture. Santa Clara County, which contains San Jose, refused to 
join the District, and San Mateo County, immediately south of the city, 
Withdrew from the District a few years later. Financing for a much trun-
cated three-county system, rather than the six-county network sought by 
San Francisco activists, was approved by the district electorate in 1962, 
and limits on the district's bonding capacity further constrained system 
deSign and construction. 20 
Their efforts earned BART district activists a hero's welcome at congres-
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sional hearings, though. Senator Harrison Williams of New Jer ey, the 
leading transit advocate in Congress, praised district representatives for 
doing "what in many areas has seemed almost impossible, to get the whole 
region, or most of the region, into a governing unit ... each jealous, of 
course, of its own sovereignty, and have done an even harder job of giving 
them the power to raise the money." Following successful passage of the 
BART bond issue, Williams described it as "a governmental miracle that 
your people . . . voted to tax themselves for this magnificent proposed 
rapid transit line. " 21 
While the downtown Oakland leadership struggled with San Francisco 
over a regional rapid transit system, they faced their own local crisis. 
Oakland and several other smaller cities in the East Bay were served by Key 
System Transit Lines, one of the handful of big-city transit properties-St. 
Louis Public Service was another-controlled by National City Lines 
(NCL). NCL sought to maintain the profitability of its transit empire in 
large part through an effort to hold down wages, a strategy that produced a 
great deal of bitterness on the part of the unionized workers who toiled on 
its properties, particularly in the many smaller cities where NCL's wage 
discipline was especially strict. The Amalgamated Association of Street, 
Electric Railway, and Motor Coach Employees of America, which repre-
sented most NCL workers, also deeply resented the company's policy of 
refusing to submit contract disputes to arbitration. As NCL sought to hold 
the line on wages during the protracted period of industry decline, strikes 
on NCL properties increased in frequency, and the co'mpany was quite 
willing to take lengthy strikes in order to enforce its bargaining position. 
The downtown Oakland leadership had to stand idly by while a Key 
System refusal to arbitrate provoked a seventeen-day strike in 1947 and a 
strike lasting two and a half months in 1953, severely affecting downtown 
business and retail sales. The latter strike was widely interpreted as an 
NCL effort to force a government buy-out of the property; the arch-
conservative Oakland leadership reluctantly moved to comply. Blessed by 
Joseph Knowland, publisher of the Oakland Tribune and a leading activist 
in the right wing of the state and national Republican party, a coalition of 
downtown business, political and technical people sponsored the creation 
of the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, to take over Key System 
and provide transit service that would strengthen downtown Oakland's 
position in the East Bay. Key System had always staunchly resisted extend-
ing lines into growing areas and providing express services to the core. 
Knowland explained to his associates: "I am not an advocate of public 
ownership, as such. But we are here confronted with a condition, not a 
theory. " 
SY ADLER 77 
The Oakland-centered regional transit government that Knowland and 
colleagues created was endowed with the broadest range of political and 
financial power of any such entity created before federal governmental 
intervention. The district was the only one in the country with an elected 
board of directors and unlimited power to tax property within its jurisdic-
tion, and it was granted a larger proportional bonding capacity than was 
its larger Bay Area counterpart. However, even the powerful downtown 
Oakland coalition was constrained in its drive to encompass the entire 
East Bay region within its district's domain. Substantial portions of both 
Alameda and Contra Costa counties successfully resisted incorporation 
into the transit district, seeking instead to foster the growth aspirations of 
their own business centers. 22 
Similar competition-driven dynamics w~re in evidence elsewhere in the 
country as well. The Manhattan-centered plan of the New York-New 
Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission drew the same kind of fire 
as in the Los Angeles and San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan areas. 
Business and political leaders in the larger New Jersey cities attacked the 
understanding that informed the commission's rail transit plan-that the 
metropolitan area constituted a single, integrated social and economic 
unit focused on the Manhattan central business district-and resisted the 
creation of a region-wide government agency that would impose the com-
mission's plan on them. Z3 Efforts to create a Baltimore-centered metropoli-
tan transit authority were similarly stymied for several years during the 
1950s, and the Chicago Transit Authority repeatedly failed to secure the 
capacity to implement major extension programs. 24 In Washington, 
D.C., the House District of Columbia Committee decided that approval 
should be sought for only that portion of a proposed rail rapid transit 
system for the national capital region that was mainly within the District 
of Columbia due to serious suburban uncertainties regarding the location 
of the proposed rail lines. 25 
In mid-1961, just as the drive for federal intervention in transit was 
gathering steam, the trade journal Metropolitan Transportation surveyed 
the thirteen major regional transport agencies then functioning, includ-
ing the New York City Transit Authority. All of these were constrained 
in various jurisdictional and/or financial ways from fully implementing the 
downtown corridor program, and in many other areas local conflicts had 
prevented the emergence of regional agencies at all. 26 The transit districts 
and authorities, such as the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
instituted as much long-distance, peak-period express service as they 
could. However, a combination of political conflict at the metropolitan 
level and state-level unwillingness to subsidize urban transport projects 
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limited the capacities of the new agencies to act. City support for federal 
intervention, for both downtown/radial freeways and transit, increased in 
relation to these political obstacles. 
The Dynamics of Federal Intervention 
Downtown activists were supported in their natural legislative effort by 
some commuter railroads, the Railway Progress Institute representing rail 
equipment manufacturers, and the Institute for Rapid Transit, which 
included rail transit operators, equipment manufacturers, and transport 
planning and engineering consulting firms. They were championed by a 
growing number of congressional representatives who sought to advance 
the interests of their constituents. However, this alliance confronted a 
tentative executive branch. Tentativeness was a product of two contradic-
tory sets of pressures bearing on top officials of both political parties and 
their executive appointees. On the one hand, national leaders of both 
parties sought to use metropolitan programs, including transit, to solidify 
relationships between national and local party organizations and to en-
hance the party's electoral appeal among target groups at the local level. 
The Democrats used urban programs aimed at traditional big-city strong-
holds in the Northeast, Midwest, and West during the Kennedy-Johnson 
years, and the Republicans adopted their own version aimed at suburban 
voters and the newer cities of the South, Southwest and Western areas 
during the Nixon period. 
Executive branch officials, however, were also concerned about ration-
alizing the national government's growing involvement with metropoli-
tan area problems. They worried about the budgetary impacts of the 
increasing amounts of subsidy, the extent to which the many programs 
were effectively coordinated, and the efficiency with which program objec-
tives were addressed. Party-building and electoral concerns, along with 
congressional advocacy, have produced periodic transit program expan-
sion. Rationalization efforts have sought continually to rein in subsidy 
commitments and discipline the allocation process according to efficiency 
objectives. Both tendencies are responses to the competition between 
places to maintain and attract mobile capital investment at the local 
level. Spatial competition engenders a continuing demand for transport 
projects that will create and maintain location advantages; executives 
continually search for ways to contain the fiscal crisis tendencies inherent 
in the growing number of project proposals. 
The kinds of transit initiatives that downtown activists sought from the 
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federal government to overcome their political and financial obstacles fell 
into three main categories; (1) institutional and financial access to inter-
state highway rights-of-way in order to realize fully the promise of the 
downtown/radial transport corridor; (2) grants to construct radial rapid-
transit facilities-for rail and bus rapid transit, both inside freeways and 
separately-that would penetrate rapidly growing suburban areas; and (3) 
subsidies for equipment and labor to operate the new peak-period services. 
It took varying lengths of time to achieve these objectives. Institutional 
commitments at the national level were fairly easily secured. Subsidies for 
equipment preceded major support for construction and right-of-way ac-
quisition, and operating subsidies were the most difficult to accomplish. 
By the mid-1970s, though, all the elements were in place. 
City officials, local transit activists, and congressional advocates began 
calling for access to freeways during debates on the national highway 
program in the mid-1950s. The American Municipal Association re-
solved at its annual convention in 1957 that the federal Bureau of Public 
Roads should authorize plans and specifications for the inclusion of transit 
facilities as an eligible federal cost in the planning of the urban segments 
of the new interstates. The idea was also boosted by Harland Bartholo-
mew, one of the nation's leading urban planners and the chairman of the 
National Capital Planning Commission. He said in 1957 that he would 
ask District of Columbia highway officials to reserve the median strips of 
two proposed highways for mass transit, and the proposed transportation 
plan released by the Bartholomew Commission in 1959 called for exten-
sive bus and rail use of freeway rights-of-way and lanes as well. 27 
As part of the Kennedy administration's response to the downtown 
coalition's transit initiative, the president called for a report on the na-
tion's mass-transit problems and needs to be jointly prepared by the Hous-
ing and Home Finance Agency and the Department of Commerce. This 
1962 report concluded that "the Bureau of Public Roads will in the future 
(a) permit the reservation of highway lanes for the exclusive use of spe-
cific types of motor vehicles when comprehensive transportation plans 
indicate this to be desirable, and (b) encourage the development of rail 
transit and highway facilities in the same right-of-way whenever more 
effective transportation will result. "28 In his transportation message to the 
Congress, presented shortly after receipt of the report, President Kennedy 
said that he had endorsed the recommendations, and during congressional 
testimony the federal highway administrator said that the Bureau of Pub-
hc Roads was implementing what the President had approved, referring 
speCifically to the charge given designers of the congressionally authorized 
Shirley Highway in the Washington, D.C., area to consider the inclusion 
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of special bus lanes. The administrator also, however, called attention to 
the fact that funds to implement the transit portion of any joint use plan 
were not yet generally available. 29 
Walter McCarter, a former Chicago transit official and now president 
of the Institute for Rapid Transit recalled at congressional hearings in 
1963 that he had worked closely with former Bureau of Public Roads chief 
Tom McDonald in the late 1940s on planning the jointly used Congress 
Street Expressway, and that McDonald had told him at the time that "If 
he had had the power ... he would not have allowed an expressway to be 
built in any metropolitan area without a median strip wide enough for a 
private right-of-way [for mass] transportation. He did not have the power 
at that time. " 30 The mayor of Seattle, representing the American Munici-
pal Association, also called on Congress to provide funds for advance 
right-of-way acquisition so that space might be reserved for transit .31 
The first major piece of transit legislation, in 1964, made available 
federal grants for land acquisition, new equipment purchase, and facility 
construction. Money for land would enable local transit agencies to begin 
implementing their share of corridor development. Funds for equipment 
would permit locals to modernize and upgrade their vehicles and facilit ies. 
This element also amounted to a protectionist industrial adjustment pol-
icy aimed at stabilizing the rail equipment manufacturers who were promi-
nent members of the transit coalition, and who stressed to Congress the 
dispersed character of their industry-plants in 468 cities in all but three 
continental states-and the likelihood of hiring back many of their work-
ers who had been laid off in 1961. 32 Construction grants would help to 
underwrite radial projects aimed at penetrating rapidly growing suburban 
areas. However, the amounts of money involved were modest. This re-
flected the still rather narrow basis of support for a program of transit 
intervention, which was concentrated among those urban areas where 
downtown already confronted suburban competition, and where existing 
private and public transit firms were clearly unable to help the central 
business district compete. 
The next major expansion of the transit program was in 1970, as 
national Republicans deployed a metropolitan strategy aimed at newer 
cities in the South, Southwest, and West whose core areas were noW 
beginning to feel the same sorts of competitive pressures as earlier had the 
older urban centers, and whose transit firms were now similarly financially 
exhausted. A lobbyist for the transit coalition noted that "now we have 
new horizon cities-younger and more expansive metropolitan areas in 
all sections of the country- wanting to build rapid rail systems to their 
suburbs. . . . In the next 20 years, all the new systems now on the 
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drawing boards will be aimed at that 10 per cent of the SMSA ... 
populations made up of commuter riders. "33 Republicans and southerners 
were attracted to a program aimed at suburban constituencies. The 
amounts available for facility expansion and equipment were increased, 
and highway fund monies were made available for exclusive or preferen-
tial bus lanes and related uses. The 1973 highway act liberalized the use of 
funds for bus-transit-related purposes. 34 
Subsidizing the operation of expanded peak-period services was the one 
remaining item on the downtown coalition agenda. When he presented 
the Kennedy administration's transit proposal to Congress in 1963, Hous-
ing and Home Finance Administrator Robert Weaver was asked, "Do we 
envision, after making a Federal investment at the capital end of the 
structure ... making future Federal contributions in the form of subsidies 
for the operation of these facilities?" Weaver responded, "We have never 
advocated such subsidies, and we have no intention of doing so. " 35 Follow-
ing passage of the 1964 legislation, though, Senator Harrison Williams, 
the leading congressional champion of transit, introduced a bill calling for 
operating subsidies, which failed. Once again, following the successful 
passage of the 1970 transit bill, the coalition sought operating subsidies. 
After a protracted campaign, in 1974 the Nixon administration decided 
to adopt, as part of a rationalization strategy discussed below, a revenue-
sharing approach within which local agencies could choose to allocate 
resources to capital or to operations and maintenance expenditures. 36 The 
final piece of the downtown coalition program was now in place. 
Rationalizing Federal Government Intervention 
A key objective for national government executives has been to reduce 
the threat to the treasury of long-term subsidizationY Several different 
ways of achieving this object have been tried. They have included na-
tional mandates that metropolitan areas created region-wide government 
agencies with the power to plan and to manage transport facilities. Re-
search and development aimed at boosting productivity was sponsored as 
well. When mandates to plan proved inattentive to efficiency concerns, 
attention to these concerns was mandated. They waged ideological cam-
paigns against expensive projects. Executive branch officials continually 
sought ways to minimize the role of legislative politics in decision-
making, in the face of constant efforts by congressional advocates to 
champion the projects of their constituents. As the subsidy costs of the 
transit program grew, executives sought to restructure the industry 
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through privatization and other marketlike strategies primarily aimed at 
strengthening management's capacity to reorganize the labor process and 
to reduce the wage bill. The focus of rationalization efforts shifted over 
time from increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of intervention in 
the urban development process to reining in the fiscal-crisis machine that 
had evolved. 
Addressing downtown coalition transit proposals, Eisenhower adminis-
tration executives called for comprehensive metropolitan land-use and 
transportation planning that would determine the nature and level of 
transit requirements and integrate transit and highway expenditures. 
These suggestions echoed concerns voiced by leading urban planners 
around the country following passage of the interstate highway program in 
1956. In his 1960 congressional testimony on an early transit bill, Eisen-
hower's commissioner of urban renewal also stressed the absence of metro-
politan governmental organizations that could finance and manage coordi-
nated transport systems. These concerns, about governmental planning 
and management capacity at the metropolitan level, and about the nature 
and extent of subsidization, were present in the Kennedy administration 
as wel1. 38 
In 1961 the Kennedy administration supported increasing federal sup-
port for planning. Housing and Home Finance Administrator Robert 
Weaver wrote to President Kennedy, and testified to Congress shortly 
thereafter, that "unless cities prepare and adopt comprehensive community 
plans, including mass transportation plans as an integral part thereof, they 
may waste both their own and Federal funds and may aggravate rather than 
correct problems of urban congestion, haphazard development, and deterio-
ration. " Plans were intended to protect the value of investments that local 
and federal governments were about to undertake. 39 Kennedy wrote to 
Congress that his proposed legislation would -"stimulate urban areas to 
establish areawide agencies empowered to plan, develop, and operate trans-
portation systems."40 This was reinforced by the stipulation, contained in 
the joint report of the Secretary of Commerce and the Housing and Home 
Finance Administrator, that, after 1 July 1965, only those highway projects 
that were consistent with areawide plans for a balanced transportation 
system would be approved. Kennedy also said that an approved comprehen-
sive plan and "the existence of a suitable organization representing all , or 
substantially all, of the local governmental units in the metropolitan area" 
were absolute requisites to federal subsidy.41 Weaver highlighted the cen-
tral importance of this last point to the national executive: "It [subsidy] has 
to go to some place where there is a central approach to the problem, or else 
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we are going to dissipate our funds entirely and make chaos, rather than an 
improvement. "42 
The emphasis on planning, governmental organization, and need assess-
ment in the early 1960s reflected the Democratic interest in party build-
ing and electoral support in central cities as well as a more general na-
tional executive interest in rationalizing the government's intervention in 
the urban development process. The institutional innovations were aimed 
at helping downtown activists achieve what they were ·unable to put in 
place at the metropolitan level due to spatial competition-induced politi-
cal conflict and state legislative opposition. At the same time, executives 
placed the transit program in the context of increasing the efficiency of 
other federal programs aimed at central city support, including freeway 
building, urban and community renewal, and housing. 
In his 1962 transportation message Kennedy discussed the essential 
need "to conserve and enhance values in existing urban areas," and the 
importance of promoting "economic efficiency and livability in areas of 
future development. " He also noted that there was a need to intervene "to 
assure more effective use of Federal funds available for other urban devel-
opment and renewal programs. "43 Lyle Fitch, president of the Institute of 
Public Administration, which did the research for the joint HHFA-
Commerce study mentioned above, articulated this point clearly in his 
1962 testimony to Congress: "In downtown areas the Federal Govern-
ment is making very large investments for redevelopment and housing 
and so from the point of view of preserving the Federal investment already 
made and in prospect, it is highly important that we assist mass transporta-
tion."44 BUilding local capacity to plan and evaluate was critical because, 
as Weaver told Congress, "This is a complex country, it is a heterogene-
ous country, and it is very difficult for us to get any staff in Washington 
that is going to be able to make this evaluation in every community. It is 
Our feeling very strongly that this has to be a matter of local responsibil-
ity .... And once you depart from this ... you are going to have a 
situation where the Federal Government is going to be dipping into a 
series of local situations, which is disastrous. "45 
Echoing a comment made by Eisenhower's urban renewal chief, 
Weaver also told Congress that the government lacked both theory and 
data to discipline the nature and extent of federal subsidy: "I think ... 
the biggest unexplored area-and one would assume there was a great 
deal of knowledge, but there really isn't-is the effect of more prompt, 
more satisfactory, more comfortable, more expeditious mass transit upon 
the rider .... [I]f you increase the service and if you make it . .. a little 
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more reasonable, is the ridership going to increase? Because if this is true, 
then you have a whole set of economic possibilities. If it isn't true, then 
you are in an entirely different situation. "46 Weaver was here articulating 
an "economist" approach to policy analysis and intervention-a concern 
with the elasticity of demand for transit-to go along with the traditional 
government preference that in the case of infrastructure projects the user-
pay principle be applied to the greatest practical extent. Economist forms 
of reasoning would become increasingly important in the executive 
branch, especially after the institutional focus of the transit program 
shifted from its origins in land use and urban development to transport 
supply. 
Interestingly, a little later in 1962 Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio, who 
was sponsoring a competing piece of transit legislation that did not in-
clude federal grants, showcased the only available example of precisely 
the sort of research that Weaver had described. Professor Leon Moses, 
research director at Northwestern University's Transportation Center, 
told a congressional committee about analyses that he was doing using 
Chicago travel data. The research question Moses discussed with Con-
gress was: "What price structure would serve to divert automobile users to 
public transportation[?]" He noted that "no one else I know of has such 
figures or has been interested in doing such a study, and yet this is the 
essential criteria necessary for a bill to subsidize mass transit, if you are 
going to subsidize it, and have some notion of what the costs are going to 
be." He warned that "the experience in Chicago . . . proves it would be 
extremely difficult to carry out diversion, and extremely expensive .... 
[Tlhe cost of the program could exceed the cost of many other subsidy 
programs we are now involved in. "47· 
Congressional transit champion Harrison Williams mocked the caution 
counseled by the economist approach. Specifically attacking Moses, Wil-
liams told Lausche's committee, "There was one witness in particular who 
seemed agitated about the fact that we don't know with any scientific 
exactitude how much it would cost to divert X number of riders from their 
automobiles to their next best choice of public transportation. I just 
wonder where this country would be today if we had to await answers to 
similar questions about other problems facing the Nation. We would 
certainly have a lot of busy and well-paid researchers tucked away in our 
universities. . . . For the sad thing is that the question this witness 
thought was in urgent need of answering is completely irrelevant to the 
problem at hand." Williams cited evidence from the Boston area, and 
from Philadelphia, where improvements in service had been associated 
with increases in transit patronage to counter the claim that not enough 
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was known about the dynamics of ridership. He also argued that the 
comprehensive planning requirements in his proposed legislation "which 
would determine the need, the value, the economic feasibility, and the 
utility of any particular transit service-is the key to the wise and prudent 
use of Federal funds." Williams agreed with Weaver that a metropolitan-
level planning capacity was essential because a national bureaucracy had 
no business telling local people how to solve their problems. 48 
The lack of interest in creating a substantial expert capacity at the 
national level, or in getting a handle on likely future levels of subsidy 
demand, reflected the congressional concern to advance the downtown 
agenda as far and as quickly as possible. Comprehensive planning was an 
arena within which to defend the interests of central business districts 
within metropolitan areas, and both Congress and the executive branch 
supported such an effort. However, suburban opposition to the re-
centralizing aims of such plans was increasing in intensity; it was a very 
weak hook upon which to hang a strategy aimed at rationalizing the urban 
development process. 
The failure of authoritative metropolitan land-use planning agencies to 
emerge increased the significance attached by downtown activists to trans-
port facilities. In the absence of plans that would maintain historic pat-
terns of land use, they looked to the new metropolitan-scale projects to 
shape the dynamics of growth, so as to maintain the hegemony of the 
central business district in the face of suburban business center competi-
tion. Ironically, just as the federal government was committing its re-
sources to using transport investments to shape the pattern of future 
metropolitan development, transportation planners engaged in plan prepa-
ration at the metropolitan level were concluding that it was essentially 
too late to accomplish this. There was already so much transport capacity 
in place that even the addition of a planned network of freeways and 
transit lines would at best marginally influence the pattern of metropoli-
tan land use. 49 
The politics of transport planning in Washington, D. c., provided early 
evidence of the obstacles confronting the planning strategy. A survey of 
mass-transportation needs was mandated by Congress. The steering com-
mittee overseeing the preparation of this survey decided not to publish a 
1959 report prepared by the Institute of Public Administration-the only 
one of the support studies done for the mandated survey that was not 
published-because they disagreed with the institute's proposal to create 
a transportation organization embracing all modes of transport that would 
be closely related to an effective regional planning agency. The institute's 
report to the Secretary of Commerce and the Housing and Home Finance 
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Administrator a few years later recommended that transit legislation con-
tain a requirement for a regional planning process backed up by a regional 
decision-making authority. These requirements were left vague in the 
bills submitted to Congress. so 
Congressional responsiveness to downtown concerns was the key ele-
ment in the policy-making process. This prevented the establishment of a 
framework conducive to an economically rational policy of transit indus-
try adjustment. The executive branch was able to resist one particular 
effort at obtaining subsidy, though: that of the Los Angeles Metropolitan 
Transit Authority to secure a federal guarantee of revenue bonds the 
Authority wished to sell to finance construction of a downtown/radial rail 
transit system. President Kennedy had referred in his transportation mes-
sage to very specialized situations in which such a guarantee might be 
appropriate. Senator Clair Engle of California told his colleagues that he 
believed that "the language contained in the President's message-I 
worked very closely with the staff people who wrote that message-was 
placed in there because of the Los Ahgeles situation," and he sponsored a 
bill that would create the possibility of such a federal guarantee. However, 
largely based on Treasury Department opposition to a financing technique 
that might interfere with its debt-management and long-term bond-
financing requirements, Engle's measure failed to pass. 51 
Following the 1964 legislation, Congress added funds for research and 
training, as well as money for planning, engineering, and designing trans-
port projects. Whether operating increasingly decimated private firms or 
continuing to operate the new governmentally owned transit systems, de-
cades of retrenchment had produced a generation of transit managers who 
were inexperienced in image-building, marketing, technological innova-
tion, and other forms of entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, the industry's 
poor financial prospects had held few attractions for a younger generation 
of managerial activists. Congress also added funds for technologically-
oriented development. In the early 1970s, though, following several years 
of increasing demand for downtown/radial rail rapid transit systems, the 
executive faced, for the first time, applications for funds that would exceed 
available monies. 52 The issue of prioritization posed a crucial test of the 
executive's capacity to conduct a rational industrial policy as well as to 
rationalize its own intervention. 
Congress had closely questioned Robert Weaver about how the execu-
tive would establish priorities before the 1964 act. Weaver answered that 
top priority would be given to those projects that were an integral part of 
authoritative comprehensive plans. In addition, the government would 
support local efforts to deal with an emergency situation in which an area 
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was threatened with the imminent loss of transit service. 53 However, 
serious questions regarding intervention choices did not arise during the 
first few years following program start-up. 
The question of allocation policy was complicated by the shift of the 
transit subsidy program to the Department of Transportation in 1968. 
The culture of Transportation disposed transit executives to the strict 
economist approach to financing infrastructure that characterized the 
department. Allocation policy was a highly controversial issue when 
Transportation was created in 1966. The most controversy was generated 
by a section in the original proposal for the department that would have 
authorized the Secretary of Transportation to develop uniform standards 
and criteria for evaluating all federal investments in proposed transport 
projects. This clearly represented an effort to rationalize the transport 
investment process; all projects would be subjected to a total systems-
oriented cost-benefit analysis. Representatives of the many modal inter-
ests were extremely concerned about this proposed section, and, with 
highway activists in the forefront, they persuaded Congress to restrict 
dramatically the scope of authority granted to the executive branch. 
While Congress determined to reserve for itself the lead role in project 
decision-making, however, the department continued to stress greater 
economic rationality in its varied interventions. 54 Grant Davis noted that 
"the bills which have been submitted [to Congress] by the [Department of 
Transportation] reflect its philosophical orientation which favors utiliza-
tion of the market mechanism and the elimination of excessive subsidy. 
Congress has not acted favorably to any of the recommendations by the 
department to increase user charges and thereby insure that transporta-
tion users pay their 'fair share. ' Furthermore, when appearing before con-
gressional committees, the organization is not held in high esteem. " 55 
The departmental concern with rationalization was reinforced by top-
level appointments made by Nixon's Urban Mass Transportation Adminis-
trator in 1969. Most of these went to people with considerable managerial 
experience in the defense and aerospace industries rather than, as had 
been the case with the original federal transit program staff, to those with 
backgrounds in land transportation, urban planning, and transportation 
economics. A hardware orientation persisted within the agency, which 
was closely linked to efforts to enhance productivity within the transit 
industry. 56 In an industry where wage costs account for the great bulk of 
operating expense, substituting capital for labor as a method of increasing 
productivity had a great deal of surface economic appeal. Moreover, given 
the extreme physical deterioration of the industry during its protracted 
period of decline, new technology had marketing appeal as well. The 
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savings theoretically available from the substitution of multicar trains 
operated by one person for a multitude of buses each operated by a driver 
was a major justification for the rail transit demands that were surfacing. 
The large number of downtown alliances seeking subsidy for expensive 
capital projects generated a great deal of budgetary anxiety. The White 
House had fears about the capacity of national transit executives to de-
velop and implement a method for rationalizing access to subsidies when 
demand exceeded available grant funds. They were concerned that Con-
gress would be irritated-and would intervene-when particular projects 
failed to secure funding commitments. In September 1973 the Office of 
Management and Budget instituted a moratorium on new projects involv-
ing railways and deleted all UMTA-requested money for rail projects in 
fiscal year 1975. An ideological campaign against rail projects was waged 
by the Department of Transportation and the UMT A administrator. 
UMT A also instituted an elaborate set of project planning requirements, 
including demands for cost-effectiveness analyses and the explicit inclu-
sion of low-capital-cost approaches among the alternatives analyzed at the 
metropolitan level. 57 
Altshuler and Curry sympathized with the procedural demands elabo-
rated by federal bureaucrats in their efforts to "avoid becoming caught in 
the middle of local controversies, to limit demand for the scarce resources 
at their disposal, and to require both statutory compliance with compre-
hensive planning requirements and the highest standards of professional 
practice without appearing to impose their own values upon urban re-
gions." Along with other transit industry activists and analysts, however, 
they felt that form was now driving substance out of transportation plan-
ning; the quality of governmental decision-making was suffering as a 
result of the emphasis on procedure,sB 
While UMT A struggled to sort out the mushrooming number of rail 
project proposals, the Nixon administration saw financial problems inten-
sifying when the downtown coalition's demand for operating subsidies 
gathered strength in the early 1970s. Academic analysts and national 
transit executives forecast dire consequences if operations were subsidized. 
They predicted that subsidies would be used inefficiently to expand ser-
vices, and that the fares charged for additional services would be far below 
the cost of their provision. In addition, they argued that transit workers 
would win substantial pay increases because the subsidies would under-
mine managerial resolve to impose wage discipline on organized labor.'9 
However, in the face of these plausible, articulate warnings, the adminis-
tration was still forced to respond to the downtown demand to increase 
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the most costly sort of service to provide-long-distance, peak-period 
routes connecting downtown with low-density suburban areas. 
The executives chose to do so by embedding a local choice to use 
subsidy funds for either capital or operating expenses in a revenue-sharing 
format. The White House wanted to reduce the discretion available to 
executive branch officials because discretionary authority stimulated con-
gressional efforts to influence its exercise. An approach that used formulas 
to allocate funds, combined with local choice about spending, was in-
tended to minimize congressional intervention in the subsidy allocation 
process. If the executive could not rationalize its own allocation process, 
then setting an overall limit and shrinking the executive's decision-
making sphere appeared to the administration as an attractive strategy to 
rationalize its own intervention. In the latter 1970s, though, Congress 
continued to increase the amount of subsidy available, as well as inter-
vene in the rail project approval process over which federal executives 
still exercised discretion. 60 
The evolution of local and federal programs of financial support, 
adapted to the pressures of spatial competition at the metropolitan level, 
exacerbated the financial troubles of the transit industry. The critics of 
operating subsidies were right. The new services often carried relatively 
light loads. At the same time, transit labor was able to secure wage gains 
enabling them to keep pace with workers in other local government 
sectors during a very inflationary period. Moreover, transit worker resis-
tance limited management's ability to reintroduce work practices that 
would soften the consequences of the continuing concentration of patron-
age in the peak hours, such as part-time labor and more split-shifts. 
TranSit units also bitterly resisted efforts to contract out work to nonunion 
firms. The result of these dynamics was a dramatic decline in industry 
productivity. 61 
The crisis was political as well as financial. Outlying business center 
coalitions increasingly saw needs for locally-responsive transport going 
unmet while downtown coalition projects absorbed ever more subsidy. 
Many central business districts did so well strengthening their competitive 
position-with freeways as well as transit-that few financial resources 
remained to subsidize the transport-related growth aspirations of outlying 
areas beginning to experience suburban gridlock. Public-sector transit 
~risis has, in turn, generated a new round of efforts to restructure the 
Industry and rationalize federal intervention, although the current situa-
tion is more complicated because of the presence of suburban business 
center activists in local, state, and federal political arenas. As a result of 
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international competition, subsidy possibilities are now more constrained 
than during the 1960s and 1970s as well. 
The Culture of Policy Discourse in Urban Transit 
One of the more controversial reports prepared during the early legislative 
debates was Technology and Urban Transportation, by John R. Meyer, John 
F. Kain, and Martin Wohl. It was commissioned by the Panel on Civilian 
Technology, which was set up under the joint sponsorship of the Presi-
dent's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, the Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers, and the Secretary of Commerce. The 
report was presented in June 1962 and released-though neither pub-
lished nor endorsed-in October. 62 Their charge was to identify areas for 
useful research in urban transportation. The authors construed their man-
date broadly, discoursing on the present and likely future course of metro-
politan development and the resulting significance for transport require-
ments. They also did cost comparisons between different modes of urban 
transit, reflected on the deep importance of social relations for a full 
understanding of transport supply and demand, and addressed the equity 
aspects of policy. The report exemplified the economist approach, stress-
ing the need to evaluate the full costs of a proposed intervention through 
a comprehensive, systemwide analysis, to find ways of using existing re-
sources more efficiently, rather than simply to expand capacity whenever 
bottlenecks appear, and to deploy a system of user charges to induce 
efficient behavior. The authors challenged many of the arguments being 
advanced on behalf of rail rapid transit projects. Within the industry, 
which was familiar with its contents, the report and the critical commen-
tary it sparked generated a "bus versus rail" controversy, but the issues it 
raised went far beyond modal conflict. 
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl called attention to the "underlying forces for 
decentralization [which] would be operative independent of any public 
policy influences since they are attributable to fundamental changes in 
technology, income levels and consumer tastes .... [T]he availability 
and use of transit does not seem to be a sufficient or a necessary condition 
for creating density or downtown growth and, conversely, provides no 
major retardant or preventive to the development of new employment 
opportunities in the urban ring. "63 Following an analysis of the compara-
tive bus and rail transit costs of supplying a hypothetical downtown corn' 
muter trip, they argued that if the capacity of urban highways was effi' 
ciently utilized during peak hours, as a result of the use of priority acceSS 
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for transit vehicles and a set of charges for congested failures, foreseeable 
levels of travel demand could be accommodated. 
In addition to their concern with efficient capacity utilization, Meyer, 
Kain, and Wohl also addressed the social and equity aspects of transit 
policy. They hypothesized that declines in off-peak shopping transit trips 
were related to the recent desegregation of buses in the South, and to a 
desire for racial segregation elsewhere as well. They forecasted a bimodal 
distribution of transit ridership; high-income executives, technicians and 
their secretaries, on the one hand, and unskilled labor used in service 
industries, on the other, mainly recruited from minority groups. They 
noted "the tendency of people with high incomes to substitute long dis-
tance commuting for direct solutions to the problems created by restric-
tions placed upon minority housing opportunities," suggesting that "it 
might be better to attack the housing segregation problem itself rather 
than attempting to perpetuate it by subsidizing additional transportation 
facilities for those whose travel demands are created by a search for segre-
gation." In the absence of restrictions on minority housing choices, a 
major resettlement of higher-income people closer to the central business 
district-where many such people worked and would increasingly work in 
the future-might occur, which, they believed, would greatly reduce, or 
even eliminate, the commuting problem. 64 
Technology and Urban Transportation was bitterly attacked by the Insti-
tute for Rapid Transit as "replete with fallacious theories and assumptions, 
erroneous mathematical analyses, and prejudiced and undocumented con-
clusions." The institute, which was composed primarily of activist engi-
neers working in transit operations, system design, and equipment manu-
facturing, was especially concerned about what it considered to be a 
distorted and biased cost comparison between bus and rail transits. How-
ever, the institute, which had positioned itself as a leading member of the 
downtown coalition seeking federal transit subsidy, also questioned 
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl's claim about the irreversible nature of the decen-
tralizing forces: "The authors appear to be entirely blind to ... down-
town building booms [in New York and Chicago] and the national move-
ment for strengthening and expanding central business districts. Surely 
the private interests, as well as local and federal governments in many 
instances, which are investing large sums of money in the downtown areas 
of the nation's great cities, do not accept the author's contention that the 
downtown area with its high concentration of population and activity is a 
thing of the past. "65 
Senator Harrison Williams also voiced his concern about Technology 
and Urban Transportation. He worried that the authors were making a 
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sweeping claim about what mode of transit was best for all metropolitan 
areas, when it was certainly "not the job of the federal government or 
others to tell a metropolitan area what modes of transportation it should 
have." Williams also thought that "it might be better to await the results 
from San Francisco before transit is consigned to the junk heap." The 
senator doubted that the authors, "who were asked to identify useful 
technological research areas, were fully qualified as observers of the social 
and economic urban scene" to comment on racial segregation. He ques-
tioned whether their suggestion to attack the housing problem rather than 
subsidizing transit "would also apply to future highway as well as transit 
expenditures, and whether the authors would go so far as to say that the 
problem of traffic congestion should be attacked by a program to get 
people to live within walking distance of their place of work," the implica-
tions being that they would be unwilling to extend the logic of their 
analysis in this manner, and in aQY case the latter notion was beyond the 
pale. 66 
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl's claim about the immutability of the forces 
producing decentralization-and that transit institutions and investments 
should efficiently serve these underlying forces-was the most serious 
challenge to planners, most of whom wanted to subordinate transport 
projects to land-use plans aimed at strengthening central business dis-
tricts. In contrast to the economist discourse embodied in Technology and 
Urban Transportation, planners' discourse stressed a set of policy choices 
premised on the malleability of the future pattern of urban development. 
In a book based on the analytical work done for the joint Commerce-
HHFA study discussed earlier, Lyle Fitch and his Institute of Public Ad-
ministration associates noted that "certain factors point to increased de-
centralization if past trends continue. But should they continue? Do we 
want density or dispersion? Do we prefer urban areas with a single center 
or with many functional nuclei? Should suburbs be integrated into the 
urban region or be largely self-contained? How should they be related to 
each other and to the central city? Do we want even development or 
urban land or clusters leaving sections of open space? These are questions 
which are unanswered in most developing urban areas and which vitally 
concern transportation planning as well as urban design. "67 
Fitch and associates set out both sides of the debate between those who 
argued the "indispensability of the central city to our culture and economy" 
and the decentralists, who emphasized "the inevitability or desirability of 
dispersion of enterprises and population . .. throughout an urban region. " 
They linked these positions on urban form to positions on transport supply, 
characterizing Meyer, Kain, and Wohl as highway proponents who ques-
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tioned "whether grade-separated mass transportation has an important role 
in the future urban complex," and who held that "planning should focus on 
the widely decentralized type of city, which is made possible and best served 
by the automobile. "68 At the national level, planning discourse focused on 
the subordination of transport projects to comprehensive land-use plans, 
leaving the resolution of the urban form debate to metropolitan planning 
processes. Fitch and associates justified intervention to subsidize transit on 
the basis that automotive transport in urban areas was subsidized, thereby 
distorting supply-and-demand choices, concluding that "if for historical 
reasons (good or bad), one mode of transportation is being subsidized by a 
certain amount per passenger trip, competing modes should be subsidized 
by at least roughly corresponding amounts per trip." Metropolitan planning 
aimed at reaching consensus on urban form goals would then take place 
without the distorting effects of unequal subsidy. 69 
Economist Leon Moses clearly expressed the focus of planning discourse 
at the local level as it contrasted with the economist emphasis on efficient 
capacity utilization. When he discussed with Congress the economist 
advice to increase the price of commuting by automobile as a way of 
inducing efficient capacity utilization, he cautioned that "city plan-
ners ... whose real concern is not traffic congestion and the inefficient 
use of highway capacity-viewed as a resource-but the economic future 
of our mature, central cities, should pause before accepting it," because 
instead of commuters shifting to transit in response to the price increase, 
"there is a strong possibility that the core area's traffic problem will be 
solved by reducing the number of people who work there."7o Working 
within the context of spatial competition, local planners and political 
leaders evaluated transport strategies from the perspective of their impacts 
on particular places; the place competition dynamic was absent from 
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl's analysis of policy conflict. Spatial competition 
would also prevent the emergence of consensus about metropolitan form 
goals that Fitch hoped planning would produce. 
As was the case with Leon Moses's testimony regarding the elasticity of 
demand for transit, Technology and Urban Transportation played a minor 
role in legislative debates. The report was referred to by a few others, 
usually to support a critique of proposed legislation. The Investment 
Bankers Association of America cited the report to support their claim 
that "population growth in metropolitan areas has not been accompanied 
by a corresponding increased need for urban mass transit facilities," and 
that any transit subsidies should come from local governments rather than 
the national treasury. 71 The American Road Builders' Association cited 
the paper to support its view that while a great deal was uncertain regard-
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ing commuter transportation problems, there was no question regarding 
the need for expressways; transit considerations, therefore, should not in 
any way compromise the integrity of the highway program. 72 The Amalga-
mated Association of Street, Electric Railway, and Motor Coach Employ-
ees of America pointed to the report to illustrate its concern that the 
federal government would be subsidizing automation. Meyer, Kain, and 
Wohl had discussed the possibilities of automated buses operating in 
special guidance lanes as a way of reducing labor costs, and automating 
fare collection and vehicle loading and unloading. These sorts of techno-
logical changes, which, the union argued, would threaten the jobs and 
the living standards of transit workers, required provisions that would 
protect workers who were adversely affected. Analysts of the 1964 transit 
act have all noted the critically important role played by organized labor 
in the legislative success of the-bill. Reflecting the weight of organized 
labor in Democratic party politics at the national and local levels, transit 
unions were able to secure institutional guarantees aimed at ensuring that 
their members would not bear a disproportionate share of the burdens of 
industrial adjustment. Labor was thus positioned to seriously challenge 
management efforts to restructure the work process. 73 
Regarding the lessons to be learned from San Francisco, however, 
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl's critique of the BART plan anticipated later 
work critical of that system and of other rail transit ventures. 74 They 
pointed out that a fixation on achieving very high average speeds on the 
line-haul portions of the Bay Area system had led to poor station spacing 
and location choices that would reduce access to potential patrons and 
lengthen door-to-door travel times, thereby depressing patronage. Their 
hypothesis of a link between racial segregation and rail transit investment 
would be supported as well. The transit lobby's coordinator during the 
1970 legislative campaign said, "The Southerners in Congress are quite 
open about its being a white commuter program; Atlanta, for example, is 
downright blunt about it .... [Tlhere is no question the realization by 
politicians of who is going to benefit from the program-the middle and 
the upper middle class-isn't an enormous tactical aid for us in working 
with Congress, especially Republicans and Southerners. "75 The attributes 
of an economically viable transit system that they set out-differentiated 
services adapted to diverse consumer demands-became the objective of 
Reagan administration executives in the 1980s. 
Planner desires to use transport investments to shape the pattern of 
metropolitan development and to strengthen the position of central busi-
ness districts would continue to clash with economic admonitions that 
such efforts were both utopian and elitist, and that services instead should 
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efficiently serve expressed patterns of demand. 76 The planner's reliance 
on the growth-shaping potential of transport, though, reflected an effort 
to substitute transport projects for land-use plans. In the absence of plans 
that would constrain the use of projects to create location advantages for 
competing places, a great deal of growth-inducing transport capacity was 
put in place. The planning ideal, articulated by one of the charter mem-
bers of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, was to "plan our 
cities so that the demand for transportation is not allowed to expand 
without limit in the first place."77 Instead, competition to retain and 
attract mobile capital rendered the planning ideal infeasible and over-
whelmed economist efforts to rationalize the transit industry. 
Senator Williams said to Institute for Rapid Transit president Walter 
McCarter, "You and I and others of like mind are going to have to 
preserve downtown commerce for the chamber of commerce." He phrased 
it this way because the U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed federal 
intervention. "Of course," he continued, "in doing it, we will make 
transportation available to the suburbanite who needs the city, wants the 
city."78 During the 1960s and early 1970s the concerns of large urban 
areas occupied a place near the top of the national agenda; downtown 
coalitions were able to overcome resistance to intervention. The way 
these coalitions shaped the transit industry adjustment policies that re-
sulted generated fiscal and political crises. A rationalizing transit policy 
would have led to a concentration of shrinking industry energies on those 
services that could be most efficiently provided and the creation of new 
industrial means to serve those markets that required different ap-
proaches. This would have included breaking apart large, difficult-to-
manage transit organizations and dramatically altering labor policies. The 
Outcome, however, was very different. During the latter 1970s national 
executives attempted to discipline the subsidy allocation process through 
planning mandates. The Reagan administration, which had little interest 
in the big cities and in governmental intervention in domestic matters, 
tried more direct approaches to rationalize intervention. These included 
continuing efforts to eliminate, or at least to reduce, operating subsidies, 
the use of performance standards to allocate resources, and support for 
privatizing the very services that had been the heart of the downtown 
coalition program. These strategies at the national level accompanied 
suburban business center demands in many metropolitan areas to reorient 
the services provided by regional transit agencies to facilitate their own 
growth aspirations and to change institutional structures and finance 
mechanisms if necessary to do SO.79 This much more complex, competi-
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tive metropolitan environment is the current context for efforts to once 
again restructure the transit industry; the dynamics that characterized the 
first phase, though, continue to influence policies of industrial adjust-
ment. 
Portland State University 
Notes 
I. Michael Danielson, Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis ( ew York, 
1965); George Smerk, Urban Transportation: The Federal Role (Bloomington, 1965); Lewis 
Schneider, "Urban Mass Transportation: A Survey of the Decision-Making Process," in 
Raymond Bauer and Kenneth Gergen, eds., The Study of Policy Formation (Glencoe, Ill., 
1968); Royce Hanson, "Congress Copes with Mass Transit," in Frederick Cleaveland, ed., 
Congress and Urban Problems (Washington, D.C., ,1969); John Burby, "Mass Transit 
Agency Faces Planning, Staffing Problems in Shift from Rags to Riches," National Journal, 
3 October 1970, 2152; David Miller, ed., Urban Transit Policy: New Perspectives (Lexing-
ton, Mass., 1972); Comptroller General of the United States, Soaring Transit Subsidies Must 
be Controlled (Washington, D.C., 1981). 
2. John Pucher, "Urban Public Transport Subsidies in Western Europe and North 
America," Transportation Quarterly 42 (July 1988). 
3. David Vogel, "Government-Industry Relations in the United States: An Over-
view," in Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, eds., Comparative GOIIernment-Industry 
Relations (Oxford, 1987); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Industrial Change (Washington, 
D.C., 1985); Wyn Grant, Government and Industry : A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. 
Canada and the U.K. (Aldershot, England, 1989). 
4. David Jones, Urban Transit Policy: An Economic and Political History (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., 1985), 120, 121. 
5. William Hartsfield, in Urban Mass Transportation-1961 , Committee on Banking 
and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st sess., June 1961, 72. 
6. Lawrence Brown, New Policies, New PoUtics: Government's Response to GOIIernment'1 
Growth (Washington, D.C., 1983). 
7. "Dear Mr. City Official," Mass Transportation 48 (August 1952); "A Bold Plan to 
Get People to Ride More," 51 (September 1955); Passenger Transport, 26 January 1953. 
8. David Markstein and Myles Jarrow, "Fringe Parking-Shuttle Bus Plan Proves 
Successful in New Orleans and in Chicago," Mass Traruportation 45 (March 1949); passen-
ger Transport, S December 1952 and 12 December 1952; Robert Mitchell, "A Diet for 
Vehicular Traffic or Starvation for Transit," Mass Transportation 48 (June 1952); Henry 
Barnes, "Traffic Engineering and Mass Transportation," Mass Transportation 48 (August 
1952); "Nashville Reserves a Separate Lane for Buses," Mass Transportation 52 (February 
1956). 
9. "The ATA Convention in St. Louis," Mass Transportation 52 (October 1956) : 25-
26. 
10. "A Plea for Emancipation," Mass Transportation 46 (May 1950); Passenger Transport, 
14 November 1952, 13 February 1959. 
11. Peter Kocan, "Why Not Charge the Rush Hour Rider?" and David Canning, "Let 
Your Schedule Maker Set Your Rates," Mass Transportation 45 (December 1949); Peter 
Kocan, "Four Years of Fare Increases," Mass Transportation 46 (January 1950); "Bold 
Experiment in Toledo," Mass Transportation 52 (January 1956); W . C. Gilman and com-
pany, Sf. Louis Metropolitan Area Transportation Study 1957-'70-'80 (New York, 1959)· 
SY ADLER 97 
12. Jones, Urban Transit Policy. 
13. "The Showpiece of the Transit Industry," Mass Transportation 52 (September 1956); 
"Nashville Transit Initiates De Luxe Commuter Service," and "Capital Transit Proposes 
Club Express Service," and John Jones, "Cincinnati Inaugurates Club Flyer Service," Mass 
Transportation 51 (February 1955). 
14. Pacific Electric Railway Company, Rebuttal Testimony and Exhibits in Case 4843 
(Sacramento, 1947), 20. 
15. Seymour Adler, The Political Economy of Transit in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945-
1963 (Washington, D.C., 1980). 
16. Ben West, in National Highway Program, Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, 
84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, 196-99. 
17. Donald Davis, Conspicuous Production: Automobiles and Elites in Detroit, 1899-1933 
(Philadelphia, 1988); Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, Rapid Transit Action Group, 
. Rail Rapid Transit-Now! (Los Angeles, 1948); Darrel Ward, "Chicago Denounces New 
Concept in Rapid Transit," Mass Transportation 58 (March 1962). 
18. California Assembly, Preliminary Report of the Assembly Investigating Committee on 
Traffic Control, Assembly Journal, 23 March 1948, 448; Santa Monica Evening Outlook, 18 
April 1949; Southwest Wave, 11 March 1948; Sy Adler, "The Transformation of the Pacific 
Electric Railway: Bradford Snell, Roger Rabbit, and the Politics of Transportation in Los 
Angeles," Urban Affairs Quarterly 27 (September 1991). 
19. Sy Adler, "Why BART but no LART? The Political Economy of Rail Rapid Transit 
Planning in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Metropolitan Areas, 1945-1957," Planning 
Perspectives 2:2 (1987). . 
20. Adler, The Political Economy of Transit in the San Fransico Bay Area, 1945-1963. 
2J. Harrison Williams in Urban Mass Transportation-1962, Committee on Banking 
and Currency, U.S. Senate, 87th Cong., 2d sess., April 1962, 156; Urban Mass 
Transportation-1963, Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, 88th Cong., 
1st sess., 1963, 86. 
22. "That St. Louis Arbitration," The Motorman, Conductor and Motor Coach Operator 
55 (August 1947); D. McClurg, "30th Convention Notes," 57 (November 1949); "Proceed-
Ings of the Thirty-Third Convention," 63 (November 1955); Oakland Tribune, 12 Septem-
ber 1956; Adler, The Political Economy of Transit in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945-1963. 
23. Jameson Doig, Metropolitan Transportation Politics and the New York Region (New 
York, 1966). 
24. "Baltimore Group to Offer Ownership Plan," Passenger Transport, 25 November 
,:955; "Baltimore Transit Bills Die in State Legislature," Passenger Transport,S April 1957; 
CIty Presents Plan for Baltimore Area Transit Authority," Passenger Transport, 13 Febru-
ary 1959; "Study Commission Drafts New Bill to Create Transit Authority for Metro 
Baltimore Area," Passenger Transport, 8 January 1960; H. Polland, "What's Ahead in '64-
ChIcago," Metropolitan Transportation and Planning, January 1964, 29. 
M 25. William Murin, Mass Transit Policy Planning: An Incremental Approach (Lexington, ass., 1971). 
26. "Is a Super Agency the Answer?" Metropolitan Transportation 57 (August 1961). 
27. "AMA adopts 1957 Policy Statement on Mass Transit," Passenger Transport, 11 ~nuary 1957; "Editorial," Mass Transportation 53 (December 1957); "Provision for Mass 
ranSlt Should Be Considered in Planning New Highways," Passenger Transport, 31 Janu-
~~ 1958; "Urge Transit Strips in D.C. Highways," Passenger Transport, 15 November 1957; 
Xpress Bus, Rapid Transit Network Proposed at D.C." Passenger Transport, 17 July 1959. 
H 28. "Joint Report to the President by the Secretary of Commerce and the Housing and 
. orne Finance Administration "in Urban Mass T ransportation-I962, Committee on Bank-tng2~n~, Currency, U.S. Senat~, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 72. 
Readi A Message from the President of the United States, 1962" in George Smerk, ed., 
T ngs In Urban Transportation (Bloomington, 1968), 309; Rex WhItton In Urban Mass 
ransPortation_I962, Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, 129. 
98 JOURNAL OF POLlCY HISTORY 
30. Walter McCarter in Urban Mass Transportation-1963, Committee on Banking and 
Currency, U.S. Senate, 151. 
31. Gordon Clinton in Urban Mass Transportation-1963, 190-91. 
32. Holcombe Parkes in Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962, Committee on Banking 
and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 439-40. 
33. William Lilley III, "Urban Interests Win Transit Bill With 'Letter-Perfect' Lobby· 
ing," National1oumal, 19 September 1970. 
34. George Smerk, The Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation (Bloomington, 1991), 
115-19. 
35. Robert Weaver in Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1963, Committee on Banking 
and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 42. 
36. Smerk, The Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation, 123-29. 
37. Dennis Quinn, Jr., Restructuring the Automobile Industry (New York, 1988). 
38. E. Williams, Jr., and D. Bluestone, Rationale of Federal Transportation Policy (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1960),52-54; David Walker in Metropolitan Mass Transportation, Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, U. S. House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, 
7. 
39. Robert Weaver in Urban Mass Transportation-1961 , 4-5. 
40. John F. Kennedy in Urban Mass Transportation...L-1961 , 4. 
41. Ibid., 4; "Joint Report to the President by the Secretary of Commerce and the 
Housing and Home Finance Administration," in Urban Mass Transportation-1962, Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, 74. 
42. Robert Weaver in Urban Mass Transportation-1961 , 25. 
43. "A Message from the President of the United States, 1962," 302-6. 
44. Lyle Fitch in Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962, 475 . 
45. Robert Weaver in Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962, 90-91. 
46. Robert Weaver in Urban Mass Transportation-1962, Committee on Banking and 
Currency, U.S. Senate, 116. 
47. Leon Moses in Urban Mass Transportation-1962, Committee on Commerce, U.S. 
Senate, 37-50. 
48. Harrison Williams in Urban Mass Transportation-1962, Committee on Commerce, 
U.S. Senate, 135. 
49. Melvin Webber, "Transportation Planning Models," Traffic Quarterly 15 (July 
1961). 
SO. Murin, Mass Transit Policy Planning, SO. 
51. Clair Engle in Urban Mass Transportation-1962, Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, U.S. Senate, 123; Alan K. Browne, "Financing California Rapid Transit," Traffic 
Quarterly 17 (January 1963). 
52. Smerk, The Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation, 97-103, 131. 
53. Robert Weaver, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1963, 60. 
54. Richard Barsness, "The Department of Transportation: Concept and Strucrure," 
Western Political Quarterly 23 (September 1970); Herman Mertins, Jr., National TransporUl-
tion Policy in Transition (Lexington, Mass., 1972). 
55. Grant Miller Davis, The Department of Transportation (Lexington, Mass., 1970), 
190. 
56. Edmond Kanwit, "The Urban Mass Transportation Administration: Its Problems 
and Promise," in David Miller, ed., Urban Transportation Policy: New Perspectives (lexing-
ton, Mass., 1972). 
57. Smerk, The Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation, 131-32. 
58. Alan Altshuler and Robert Curry, "The Changing Environment of Urban Develop-
ment Policy-Shared Power or Impotence?" Urban Law Annual 10:3 (1975). 
59. William Lilley III, "Transit Lobby Sights Victory in Fight for Massive Subsidy 
Program," National1ournal, 4 March 1972. 
SY ADLER 99 
60. Smerk, The Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation, 132; U.S. Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration, Feasibility of Federal Assistance for Urban Mass Transporta-
tion Operating Costs (Washington, D.C., 1971); "Mass Transit: The Expensive Dream," 
Business Week, 27 August 1984. 
61. Don Pickrell, "Federal Operating Assistance for Urban Mass Transit: Assessing a 
Decade of Experience," in Transit Pricing and Performance, Transportation Research Record 
1078 (Washington, D.C., 1986). 
62. John R. Meyer, John F. Kain, and Martin Wohl, Technology and Urban Transporta-
tion (Washington, D.C., 1962); Joseph Ingraham, "Car-Bus Transit for Cities Urged," New 
York Times, 30 October 1962. 
63. Meyer, Kain, and Wohl, Technology and Urban Transportation, 21. 
64. Ibid., 42-43, 46-49, 58, 91, 94, 97-98, 112-14. 
65. "An Evaluation of a Report Entitled 'Technology and Urban Transportation,' " 
Institute for Rapid Transit Newsletter 4 (August 1963): 5-9. 
66. Harrison Williams, Jr., "Who's Right in Rail-Bus Row?" Metropolitan Transportation 
59 (January 1963): 25. 
67. Lyle Fitch and Associates, Urban Transportation and Public Policy (San Francisco, 
1964), 20. 
68. Ibid., 20-21. 
69. Ibid., 156. 
70. Leon Moses in Urban Mass Transportation-1962, Committee on Commerce, U.S. 
Senate, 48, 50. 
71. Investment Bankers Association of America in Urban Mass Transportation-I 963, 
398-403. 
72. American Road Builders' Association in Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1963, 
555-57. 
73. Bernard Cushman in Urban Mass Transportation-I 963, 328-29; See the sources 
cited in note I. 
74. Meyer, Kain, and Wohl, Technology and Urban Transportation, 106; Melvin Web-
ber, The BART Experiment: What Have We Learned! (Berkeley, 1976). 
75. William Lilley III, "Urban Interests Win Transit Bill With 'Letter-Perfect' Lobby-
ing," National}oumal, 19 September 1970, 2026. 
76. Peter Hall and Carmen Hass-Klau, Can Rail Save the City! (London, 1985); Martin 
Wachs, "U.S. Transit Subsidy Policy: In Need of Reform," Science, 30 June 1989; New 
Urlxm Rail Transit: How Can Its Development and Growth-Shaping Potential Be Realized! 
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1980; Andrew Hamer, Selling Rail Rapid Transit (Lexington, Mass. , 1976). 
77. Kanwit, "The Urban Mass Transportation Administration," 86-87. 
78. Harrison Williams in Urban Mass Transportation-1963, 150. 
79. Sy Adler, Understanding the Dynamics of Innovation in Urban Transit (Washington, 
D.C., 1986). 
